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 Thomas Noe 

Courses taught

MBA Finance II
MBA Advanced Topics in Corporate Finance

Expertise

Corporate finance.
Financial security design.
Game theory.
Artificial agent economies.

Overview

Thomas Noe, (PhD, Texas, Austin) is Ernest Butten Professor of Management Studies at the Saïd Business School.  Prior to joining the School, he held the A. B. Freeman Chair in Finance at Tulane University.

He is one of the 20 most prolific researchers in elite finance journals since the turn of the century, appearing in journals such as the American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Economic Studies, and Review of Financial Studies. Currently, he is a co-editor of the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. In addition, he has served on numerous panels, programme committees, and editorial boards, including the board of the Review of Financial Studies

Over the span of his career, he has visited academic and research institutions on five continents, including the Federal Reserve Bank, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Auckland, Universidad de Chile,  Universidad los Andes, University of Oxford, and the University of Queensland.

Research interests

Professor Noe’s research focuses on developing and experimentally validating rational choice models of financing, investment, governance, and management compensation. Among many significant results, his earlier research has derived optimal corporate security designs under asymmetric information, determined the effect of investor activism strategies on corporate stock liquidity, and modeled the effect of financial market learning on security design.

His current research focuses on such topics as the optimal design of governance and CEO compensation in a dynamic context, the effect of external finance on the incentives for opportunistic corporate behaviour, the relation between the IPO cycles and and the market for investment banking labour, and the effect of intra-family altruism on the investment and financing policies of family firms. 

Journal articles:


Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation, working paper (with A. Gillette and M. Rebello), forthcoming in the Review of Finance.

Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets (with N. Khanna and R. Sonti), forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies.

The evolution of security designs, (with M. Rebello and J. Wang),  Journal of Finance 61, 2103-2135, 2007.

Exotics and electrons: Electric power crises and the financial risk management (with S. Banerjee), Journal of Business 79, 2659-2696, 2007.

The role of debt purchases in takeovers: A tale of two retailers (with M. Rebello), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 15, 609-648, 2006.

If at first you don’t succeed: An experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers and the provision of public goods (with A. Gillette), Review of Financial Studies 19,  561 - 603. 2006.

Crushed by a rational stampede: Strategic share dumping and shareholder insurrections (with M. Attari and S. Banerjee), Journal of Financial Economics 79,  181–222, 2006.

Winner take all: Competition, strategy, and the structure of returns in the internet economy (with G. Parker), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 14, 141-164, 2005.

Fooling all of the people some of the time: A theory of endogenous sequencing in confidential negotiations (with J. Wang), Review of Economic Studies 71, 855-881,2004.

Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence, (with A. Gillette and M. Rebello) Journal of Finance 63, 1997-2031, 2003.

Corporate financing:  An artificial agent-based analysis (with M. Rebello and J. Wang), Journal of Finance 63, 943-973, 2003 (lead article).

Reputation and the market for distressed-firm debt (with M. Rebello), Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 503-522, 2003.

Structuring international joint ventures: bargaining, equity participation, and private information, (with M. Rebello, and M. Shrikhande), Review of Financial Studies 15, 1251-1282, 2002.

Investor activism and financial market structure, Review of Financial Studies 15, 289-319, 2002.

Bond calls, credible commitment and equity dilution: A theoretical and clinical analysis of Simultaneous Tender and Call (STAC) offers (with U. Dhillon, and G. Ramirez), Journal of Financial Economics 60, 573-611, 2001.

Systemic risk and financial market structure (with L. Eisenberg), Management Science 47, 236-249, 2001.

Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives (with Jie Hu),
Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 679-714, 2001.

Strategic debt restructuring (with J. Wang), Review of Financial Studies 13, 985-1016, 2000.

Genetic algorithms, learning, and the dynamics of corporate takeovers  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, 189-217, 2000.

Rationalizable and coalition proof shareholder tendering strategies in corporate takeovers, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 11, 269-291, 1998.

Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization
13, 287-318, 1997.

Cash flows and debt maturity (with G. Goswami and M. Rebello), Economica 64, 303-316, 1997.

Regulatory distortion of management compensation: The case of golden parachutes for bank managers (with J. Evans and J. Thornton), Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 825-848, 1997.

Unconditional and conditional takeover offers: theory and experimental evidence (with J. Kale), Review of Financial Studies 10 735-766, 1997.

Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion (with M. Rebello) Journal of Business 70, 385-408, 1997.

Asymmetric information, asset substitution, and the design of securities (with D. Nachman), Advances in Financial Economics 2, 151-186, 1996.

Collusion in uniform-price auctions: Experimental evidence and implications for Treasury auctions, (with G. Goswami and M. Rebello), Review of Financial Studies 9 , 757-786, 1996.

Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism, financing, and payout polices (with M. Rebello), Journal of Finance 51, 637-660, 1996.

Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks, (with M. Rebello, and L. Wall), Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 331-350, 1996.

Share repurchases announcement returns under shareholder heterogeneity, (with J. Kale and G. Gay) Advances in Quantitative Analysis in Finance and Accounting 4, 47-58, New York, JAI Press,
1996.

(Dutch) auction share repurchases, (with J. Kale and G. Gay) Economica 63, 57-80, 1995.

Consumer activism, producer groups, and production standards, (with M. Rebello) Journal of Economics, Behavior and Organization 27, 69-86, 1995.

Cash flow correlation, debt maturity choice and asymmetric information, (with G. Goswami, and M. Rebello), Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting, New York, JAI Press, 1995.

Debt-financing under asymmetric information, (with G. Goswami and M. Rebello), Journal of Finance 50, 633-659, 1995.

Of shepherds, sheep, and the cross-autocorrelations in equity returns, (with S. Badrinath and J. Kale), Review of Financial Studies 8, 401-432, 1995.

Takeovers of diffusely held firms: A nonstandard approach, Mathematical Finance 5, 247-277, 1995.

Information quality, performance measurement, and security demand in rational expectations economies, (with S. Ramamurtie), Journal of Finance 50, 341-361, 1995.

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management, (with David Nachman), Economic Theory 5, 315-335, 1995.

Dilution costs and utility regulation under asymmetric information, (with J. Kale), Journal of Regulatory Economics 7, 177-197, 1995.

(Micro) fads in asset prices: evidence from the futures market, (with G. Gay, R. Kolb, and J. Kale), Journal of Futures Markets 14, 637-659, 1994 (lead article).

The dynamics of business ethics and economic activity, (with M. Rebello) American Economic Review 84, 531-547, 1994.

Optimal design of securities under asymmetric information, (with David Nachman) Review of Financial Studies 7, 1-44, 1994 (lead article).

The impact of dual-class creation on shareholder wealth, (with J. Jeong) Corporate Governance 1, 137-140, 1993.

Rent division, restructuring and managerial risk taking: A strategic bargaining model, (with M. Rebello), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2, 245-276, 1993.

Segmented markets, differential information, and asset return dynamics, (with S. B. and J. Kale), International Review of Economics and Finance 2, 287-292, 1993 (invited paper).

Adverse selection, contract design and investment distortion, (with M. Rebello), Journal of Financial Intermediation 2, 347-375, 1992 (lead article).

A note on diversification in parametric rational expectations economies, (with B. S. Ramamurtie), Economics Letters 39, 425-429, 1992.

Taxes, financial distress, and corporate capital structure, (with J. Kale) Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 1, 71-83, 1992.

Stock authorizations: A sequential equilibrium analysis, (with N. Jayaraman) Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 1, 383-398, 1991.

Share repurchases mechanisms: a comparative analysis of efficacy, shareholder wealth, and corporate control effects, (with J. Kale and G. Gay) Financial Management 44-59, 1991.

The effect of business risk on corporate capital structure: Theory and evidence (with J. Kale and G. Ramirez) Journal of Finance 46, 1693-1716, 1991.

Debt-equity choice under asymmetric information, (with J. Kale) Economics Letters 35, 215-219, 1991.

Dividends, uncertainty, and underwriting costs under asymmetric information, (with J. Kale), Journal of Financial Research 13, 265-277, 1990 (lead article).

Corporate hedging under personal and corporate taxation, (with J. Kale), Managerial and Decision Economics 11, 199-205, 1990.

Risky debt maturity choice in a sequential game equilibrium, (with J. Kale), Journal of Financial Research 8, 155-165, 1990.

Share repurchases through transferable put rights: theory and case study, (with G. Gay and J. Kale), Journal of Financial Economics 25, 141 - 160, 1989.

Economic policy failure with endogenous voting, (with S. Magee), Hong Kong Economic Papers 19, 9-12, 1989.

Noisy juries and choice of trial mode in a sequential signaling model: theory and evidence, (with G. Gay, J. Kale, and M. Grace) RAND, Journal of Economics 20, 196 - 213, 1989. Reprinted in The Economic Analysis of Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights, edited by Hugo M. Mialon and Paul H. Rubin, Routledge, November 2007.

Capital structure and signaling game equilibria, Review of Financial Studies 1, 321 - 355, 1988 (lead article).

Working papers:


Stock market liquidity and firm performance: Wall Street rule or Wall Street rules? (with V. Fang, and S. Tice).

Product market efficiency: The bright side of myopic, uninformed, and passive external finance (with M. Rebello and T. Rietz).

Activists, raiders, and directors: Opportunism and the balance of corporate power (with M. Rebello and M. Sonti).

To each according to her luck and power: Optimal corporate governance and compensation policy in a dynamic world (with M. Rebello).

Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation (with M. Rebello and J. Wang).

Buying up the block: An experimental investigation of capturing economic rents through sequential negotiations (with G. Goswami and J. Wang).

Fat tails and slumping shoulders: Kurtosis and the market microstructure of daily returns (with S. Banerjee and D. Lesmond).

Thicker than water: Corporate governance and family values around the world (with J. Benvenides).

Doom or gloom? CEO stock options in the post-Enron world (with S. Banerjee and V. Gatchev).

Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation.

Contact Details

Saïd Business School
University of Oxford
Park End Street
Oxford
OX1 1HP
UK

Thomas.Noe@sbs.ox.ac.uk 

+44 (0)1865 288933