Jones’s research interests lie in the role of investment banks in capital raising, private equity and institutional asset management. His work has been published in the Journal of Finance, the Review of Financial Studies and European Financial Management, as well as in practitioner journals and the financial press.
Investment banks and conflicts of interest
To date Jones’s research has focused on the incentives and conflicts of interests that investment banks face when dealing with investors and issuing companies in initial public offerings (IPOs). A recent paper entitled ‘Why don’t U.S. issuers demand European fees for IPOs?’ published in the Journal of Finance (2011), which examines the discrepancy between IPO fees in Europe and the US, concludes that the US market is less competitive than the European, and reveals evidence of implicit collusion among US underwriters.
His 2009 paper ‘IPO pricing and allocations: a survey of the views of institutional investors’ found that the pricing and allotment of IPOs by investment banks reflects a combination of profit-maximization and the desire to create a stable investor base for the issuer. Another 2009 paper, ‘Competitive IPOs,’ examines the ways in which issuers have altered the design of IPOs to enhance their own bargaining position vis-à-vis investment banks.
Jones and his co-author, Tim Jenkinson, were awarded the best paper prize in 2007 by European Financial Management for their research entitled ‘The economics of IPO stabilization, syndicates and naked shorts,’ which examines one mechanism by which the interests of issuer and investment banks can be aligned.
Jones has a related interest in the role of research analysts. He was one of a group of experts mandated to report to the European Commission on best practice for financial analysts, and he has been actively involved in debates about how to guard against bias in analysts’ research.
Related publications
Abrahamson, M., Jenkinson, T. and Jones, H., 'Why don't U.S. issuers demand European fees for IPOs?', Journal of Finance, 66(6) (2011), 2055-2082.
Jenkinson, T. and Jones, H., 'Competitive IPOs', European Financial Management, 15(4) (2009), 733-756.
Jenkinson, T. and Jones, H., 'IPO pricing and allocations: a survey of the views of institutional investors', Review of Financial Studies, 22(4) (2009), 1477-1504.
Jenkinson, T. and Jones, H., 'The Economics of IPO Stabilization, Syndicates and Naked Shorts', European Financial Management, 13(4) (2007), 616-642 (Best Paper award for 2007).
Jenkinson, T. and Jones, H., 'Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding', Journal of Finance, 59(5) (2004), 2309-2338.
Jones, H., 'Financial Analysts: Best Practices in an Integrated European Financial Market', Experts’ Report to the European Commission, September 2003.
‘Keeping them honest? An analysis of competitive IPOs’, International Financing Review, October 2009.
‘Are banks profiteering in IPOs?’ Professional Investor, November 2007.
‘The Bookbuilding Debate’, Capital Ideas, January 2004.
‘IPOs have hidden costs for issuers’, Mint, 3 September 2007.
‘Google empowers the end-investor’, Financial Times, 28 June 2004.
‘Google can find a way to price its shares fairly’, Financial Times, 3 November 2003.
‘The FSA needs to focus on research quality’, Financial Times, 1 October 2003.
‘Analysis Paralysis: Is investment research in integrated banks a case of synergy or chicanery?’, Business at Oxford, 2003
‘Breaking up the banks’, Financial Times, 27 August 2002.
‘IPOs von Töchtern sind in Mode gekommen’, Börsen-Zeitung, 10 June 2000.
Private equity funds and IPOs
Jones is currently working on a number of projects related to IPOs backed by private equity (PE) firms. He is particularly interested in how PE-backed IPOs perform, at issue and afterwards, compared with other IPOs, and why and for how long PE firms retain holdings in portfolio companies after they have listed them.
Pension fund management
In this area, Jones is examining the effectiveness of trustees in making asset allocation decisions, the input they receive from their advisers, and the incentives under which they operate. The aim is to explore the relationship between different models of pension fund governance on the one hand and pension fund performance on the other.